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Radical, Religious, and Violent
The New Economics of Terrorism - MIT Press
Eli Berman
How do radical religious sects run such deadly
terrorist organizations? Hezbollah, Hamas, Lashkar-e-Taiba, and the
Taliban all began as religious groups dedicated to piety and charity.
Yet once they turned to violence, they became horribly potent,
executing campaigns of terrorism deadlier than those of their secular
rivals.
In Radical, Religious, and Violent, Eli Berman approaches
the question using the economics of organizations. He first dispels
some myths: radical religious terrorists are not generally motivated by
the promise of rewards in the afterlife (including the infamous
seventy-two virgins) or even by religious ideas in general. He argues
that these terrorists (even suicide terrorists) are best understood as
rational altruists seeking to help their own communities. Yet despite
the vast pool of potential recruits—young altruists who feel their
communities are repressed or endangered—there are less than a dozen
highly lethal terrorist organizations in the world capable of sustained
and coordinated violence that threatens governments and makes hundreds
of millions of civilians hesitate before boarding an airplane. What's
special about these organizations, and why are most of their followers
religious radicals?
Drawing on parallel research on radical religious Jews, Christians, and
Muslims, Berman shows that the most lethal terrorist groups have a
common characteristic: their leaders have found a way to control
defection. Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Taliban, for example, built
loyalty and cohesion by means of mutual aid, weeding out "free riders"
and producing a cadre of members they could rely on. The secret of
their deadly effectiveness lies in their resilience and cohesion when
incentives to defect are strong.
These insights suggest that provision of basic social services by
competent governments adds a critical, nonviolent component to
counterterrorism strategies. It undermines the violent potential of
radical religious organizations without disturbing free religious
practice, being drawn into theological debates with Jihadists, or
endangering civilians.
About the Author
Eli Berman is Professor of Economics at the University of California,
San Diego, and Research Director for International Security Studies at
the University of California Institute on Global Conflict and
Cooperation.
You can follow Prof. Berman's updates on the topics of religion, economics and violence under "clubmodel" on twitter.